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Would African-Americans Have Been Better Off Without Brown v. Board of
Education?
Jack M. Balkin
Suppose that the United States Supreme Court had reaffirmed Plessy v. Ferguson in
Brown v. Board of Education and strictly enforced its separate but equal doctrine.  What would
have been the subsequent history of educational opportunity for African-Americans?  Charles
Hamilton Houston’s original strategy was to persuade courts to enforce Plessy strictly, assuming
that southern states would not be able to afford a truly separate but equal school system.  If
southern states wanted quality education for their white children they would be forced to
integrate to save money. So it is interesting to speculate whether African American children
would have been better off with strict enforcement of Plessy.  Perhaps black parents might have
gotten integrated schools anyway, or if not integrated schools, then equal schools.
Remedies under Plessy would not have required courts to bus school children.  Without
court ordered busing, politicians in both the North and South might not have been able to whip
up the same degree of racial resentment.  If so, the movement for equalization of schools and
systems of school finance might not have become so deeply racialized.  The Supreme Court
might have decided the Rodriguez case differently-- finding a federal constitutional right of equal
educational opportunity-- or perhaps school equalization suits in the states might have made
greater headway.  Conceivably the policy debate would have been less about race and more about
class, and African American children would be better off as a result.  In addition, if states chose
equalization instead of integration, a generation of black principals and schoolteachers might not
have been displaced, and this might have benefitted the black community as a whole.  Finally, if
the courts refrained from directly overrulling Plessy, the movement for racial equality and equal
opportunity would more clearly have seemed to come from Congress and the political branches
rather than from the courts.  This would make civil rights seem more democratic and less an
imposition on democracy by judicial elites.
Nevertheless, I am skeptical that things would have turned out very differently if the
Court had reaffirmed Plessy’s doctrine of separate but equal in 1954.  In answering this question
an important preliminary issue is how the change would have affected the fate of the civil rights
movement.  There are good reasons to think that reaffirming separate but equal would not
necessarily have derailed the movement.  Even before Brown was decided, the Baton Rouge
boycott had occurred.  The civil rights movement would have proceeded apace without the
Brown we know today, and conceivably with less southern white resistance.  After all, the
decision in Brown polarized public opinion, stiffened white southern resistance and put southern
white racial moderates in a politically difficult position.  Of course, this cuts both ways, for one
could argue that southern intransigence actually aided the civil rights movement by arousing
northern sympathies.  Nevertheless, it is difficult to maintain that by itself hatred of Brown
perversely guaranteed the success of the civil rights movement.  It was only one factor among
many.  This suggests that even had the Court pushed for strict equalization instead of overruling
Plessy, there eventually would have been federal civil rights legislation, although it might not
have occurred precisely when it did.  Moreover, in both scenarios, civil rights legislation would
probably have done more to promote racial equality than any court decision.  Recall that Brown
itself was not very successfully enforced in the South until Congress passed Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, which threatened southern schools with financial penalties for continued
intransigence.
Indeed, it is entirely possible that if the civil rights movement had succeeded without
Brown, and if Congress had passed something like the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the 1965
Voting Rights Act, the Court soon would have followed the political tides and overruled Plessy,
perhaps at most a decade or so after it actually did.  Put another way, a successful social
movement would have eventually doomed Jim Crow anyway-- the only question is whether the
courts or the political branches would have moved first.
However, even if blacks would not have been much worse off under a continued regime
of separate but equal, it does not follow that they would have been better off.  It is important to
recall that strict enforcement of Plessy did not require actual equality in educational opportunity. 
Plessy merely presented an either/or proposition.  If the states segregated by law, they had to
make facilities equal.  But if states did not segregate by law,  Plessy did not require equalization
of facilities.  That meant that in the North, where school segregation was not mandated by law,
Plessy was virtually useless in guaranteeing equal educational opportunity for African
Americans.  In the South, many school districts might have moved to freedom of choice plans (as
they did in the years after Brown), which were nominally race neutral but which would have
escaped Plessy’s requirement of equal funding and equal facilities.  It would have been relatively
easy for southern school districts to argue that their school systems were not formally “separate”
(even if they were so in fact) if that would relieve them from equalization responsibilities. 
Indeed, as cities and suburbs grew in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, strict promotion of
neighborhood school policies would have produced largely segregated public schools without
any constitutional requirement of equal funding or equal facilities.  In this respect, the result
would have been much the same as actually occurred.  The only difference is that there would be
no available constitutional argument (along the lines of the Court’s 1968 decision in Green v.
New Kent County School Board) that racially identifiable schools violated the Constitution.  So
white flight to suburbs would probably still have occurred, and because minority schools in inner
cities would be de facto rather than de jure segregated, there would be no constitutionally
mandated equalization requirement.  Under this line of reasoning, strict enforcement of Plessy
would have done blacks little good because the decision would have been even easier to get
around than the relatively toothless enforcement of Brown itself.
Indeed, retaining Plessy might have left blacks worse off.  Much school segregation
occurred because of residential segregation produced by the racially discriminatory housing and
real estate policies of private parties, state and local officials, and the federal government.  Many
of the policies of state actors were technically illegal under Brown and later cases, but the laws
were systematically underenforced or narrowly construed.  If Plessy had not been overruled, then
presumably there would have been even less protection against racial discrimination in housing
policies, and therefore the effect of housing segregation on school segregation would have been,
if anything, even more pronounced.  To be sure, Congress might still have passed federal housing
discrimination legislation in the late 1960's, but there is no reason to think that it would be more
strictly or fairly enforced if Plessy had been retained.
Social forces in both the North and South sought to maintain white racial privilege and
material benefits in the face of increasingly strident demands by African-Americans in the 1950s
and 1960s.  Those social forces in defense of white privilege would probably have been just as
strong whether the doctrinal forms were those mandated by Plessy or those mandated by Brown. 
In either case whites would have attempted to preserve as much as possible and sought practical
end runs around the formal legal regime.  It is therefore not surprising that the results would have
been the same in many respects.
The key issue is how legal doctrines interact with social norms.  In general, legal
doctrines are most efficacious when they are powerfully supported by social norms, are difficult
to circumvent, and cannot easily be watered down or evaded by disputes over their interpretation
or meaning.  Conversely, legal doctrines are least efficacious when they move against the tide of
social norms, when there are fairly easy ways to get around them, and when they are relatively
abstract or underdetermined.  This suggests that the choice between the actual decision in Brown
or strict enforcement of Plessy’s “separate but equal” formula would not have made much
difference.  If Brown was easy to evade, so too would have been a reenergized doctrine of
“separate but equal.”  Even before Brown, southern judges and lawyers for segregated southern
school districts had little difficulty manipulating factual records to conclude that black and white
schools were “substantially” equal.  Nor would strict enforcement of Plessy have gained much
social support.  During the 1950's much of the country outside the South– and particularly
opinion elites-- increasingly thought of  Jim Crow as an embarrassment, but the country did not
particularly support integration or redistribution of substantial amounts of income or resources to
African Americans.  And of course, in the deep South there was strong attachment to the racial
status quo.  That racial status quo had both symbolic and material elements-- it involved not only
segregation of the races but also preservation of material advantages for whites.  Thus, it is
tempting but overly optimistic to assume that whites would have been happy to fund black
schools equally as long as their children did not have to share classrooms with black students.
Ultimately the question is not whether the courts did the right thing in overturning Plessy
in 1954. The question is whether the American people did the right thing in responding to the
civil rights movement and passing civil rights legislation during the 1960's.  They did do the right
thing, but there is a lot more that they could have done, and a lot more that they still could do.
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